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A Process-Philosophical Understanding of Organizational Learning as “Wayfinding”: 
Process, Practices and Sensitivity to Environmental Affordances 
 
 
Abstract: 
Purpose – The paper articulates a practice-based, non-cognitivist approach to Organizational 
Learning. 
 
Design/Methodology/Approach: Explores the potential contribution of a process-based 
“practice turn” in social theory for understanding Organizational Learning. 
 
Findings: In complex, turbulent environments, robust organizations recur more to cultivated 
sensitivities and predispositions rather than rely on elaborate plans and strategies to guide 
their action; they “Wayfind” their way to sustainable success. 
 
Originality/Value: Develops the understanding of Organizational Learning as a process of 
everyday practical coping guided by internalized sensitivities and predispositions. 
 
Keywords: Becoming, social practices, habitus, empirical sensitivity, environmental 
affordances, Wayfinding 
 
Paper Type: Viewpoint 
 
Introduction 
Discussions surrounding the literature on Organizational Learning are underpinned by two 
contrasting emphasis regarding the nature of learning and action; one essentially cognitivist 
(Argyris and Schön, 1978; Hedberg, 1981; Fiol and Lyles, 1985), the other essentially 
behaviourist (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Levitt and March, 1988). 
More recent conceptual interventions emphasizing the “distributed”, socially-constructed, 
and/or contextually-situated nature of learning (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Lave and Wenger, 
1991; Cook and Yanow, 1993) point towards unresolved tensions between these two 
emphases. More conceptual untangling is needed. In the first instance Organizational 
Learning (OL) is differentiated from “mere” behavioural change/adaptation and defined as a 
“higher level” cognitive activity involving the “development of shared understanding and 
conceptual schemes among members of the organization” (Fiol and Lyles, 1985, p. 806; see 
also Hedberg, 1981; Örtenblad, 2001). In the second, OL is viewed as “routine based, 
history-dependent and target-oriented” (Levitt and March, 1988, p. 319). One emphasises 
learning as the “storing” and “sharing” of knowledge and understanding through elaborate 
communication systems, standard operating procedures, mental models, documents…etc. 
(Örtenblad, 2004, p. 133), the other emphasises the importance of learning through direct 
practical engagement; bodily hexis, routines and habit-driven actions describes this kind of 
learning. One presumes that learning and action are driven by a rational-calculative “logic of 
consequentiality”, the other a “logic of appropriateness” (March, 2003, p. 205) whereby 
behaviour involves simply “matching procedures to situations” (Levitt and March, 1988, p. 
320). In essence, therefore there is a relatively unacknowledged conceptual tension existing 
in the extant literature that has been insufficiently addressed; that between a behavioural and 
a cognitivist understanding of learning. This has important implications for research and 
theorizing in Organizational Learning.  
In this paper, I take sides with Cyert and March’s (1963) more behavioural approach 
which emphasises learning through direct engagement and adaptive action. This has some 
resonances with “action learning” (Revans, 1980; Pedler, 1997; Raelin, 1997) but crucially, 
the social dimension of such experience-based learning is missing from the latter and 
insufficiently developed in Cyert and March’s own work and in the work of others who are 
aware of the social aspects of learning (see, for instance, Gherardi et al., 1998). I argue here 
that, what is presently undertheorized in the OL literature is the key role that socially-learnt 
practices play in shaping an organization’s disposition and modus operandi and hence the 
kind of strategic actions taken. It is an organization’s repertoire of established social practices 
and the sensitivities and dispositions they instil, and not so much pre-specified plans, goals or 
articulated “rules” and “routines” that gives coherence and consistency to its actions when 
faced with environmental challenges. End-goals, plans and mental models or schemas are not 
a prerequisite for actions to be coherent, consistent and effective. Intelligent action can 
happen without the prior need for cognition and mental representation.  
The recent process-based “practice turn” in social theory (Bourdieu, 1977/2002; 
Dreyfus, 1991; Schatzki, 2001) offers an alternative way of understanding how organizations 
are able to learn and respond to environmental demands without overly relying on conscious 
cognition. By conscious cognition I mean the deliberate processing of abstract mental images 
and representations in the mind as the basis of learning. Much of OL as a collective 
endeavour can be adequately explained as the silent transmission and absorption of social 
practices by members of the collective that occurs non-deliberately and unconsciously. This 
is not to suggest that cognitive learning does not happen or that it is not important, but that it 
can only take place because prior unconscious adaptive and improvisatory learning has 
already taken place; social practices provide the necessary substrate for cognitive learning 
to be possible.  
I maintain that in turbulent times where change is perpetual and relentless, OL that 
over-relies on cognitively-articulated plans, detailed execution strategies and clear road maps 
for “navigating” the uncertain waters of environmental changes, can be a hindrance more 
than a help. Instead, under such relentlessly changing circumstances effective organizational 
responses often recur to internalised predispositions that involve a heightened sensitivity to 
environmental perturbations. In the face of uncertainty, organizations learn to respond more 
by sensing, improvising and adapting as they go; they rely more on practice-acquired 
sensitivities and dispositions to help them cope, adjust and adapt effectively. In contrast to 
“navigation” which presupposes the existence of pre-established goals and route maps, and 
which assumes that we must know “before we go”, this alternative practice-based form of OL 
entails learning and “knowing as we go”. I call this learning process “Wayfinding”.  
Wayfinding as a practice-based understanding of social behaviour can only be 
properly understood through a worldview that takes emergence and Becoming as a 
fundamental feature of everyday reality. From this process-philosophical worldview, the 
social entities, categories and distinctions that we find so familiar, are not “ready-made” or 
objectively given “out there”. Instead, they only emerge and become what they are as the 
aggregative effects of social actions. Everyday coping actions contribute towards generating 
social and organizational orders and the learnings associated with them. This basic form of 
learning, that I call Wayfinding, depends upon a refined empirical sensitivity to ongoing 
environmental changes and the constant discovery of appropriate responses needed to deal 
with such changes.  
Wayfinding better describes how successful organizations cope effectively in the face 
of uncertainty. It entails constantly sensing, adapting and effectively responding to 
environmental solicitations and taking advantage of their affordances to meet the 
organization’s evolving needs. Much of this happens prior to mental cognition and 
retrospective rationalization. Superior organizational performance, as such, depends on how 
successfully an organization is able to detect and “bending” the grain of the world’s 
becoming to aid its own survival and growth. This is what gives an organization its 
competitive edge. But this practice-based understanding of OL as Wayfinding is best 
understood from a process-philosophical worldview and it is to this consideration that I now 
turn.  
 
From Being to Becoming: Towards a Process-Philosophical Worldview 
Western philosophical outlooks have been shaped by two contrasting and competing 
worldviews; one inspired by the Heraclitean emphasis on the ever-fluxing and changing 
nature of ultimate reality, the other by a Parmenidean insistence on its permanent and 
unchanging nature (Mansley-Robinson, 1968). It pits a metaphysics of Becoming against a 
metaphysics of Being (Chia, 1999; Tsoukas and Chia, 2002). The history of western thought 
has been dominated by subsequent ceaseless attempts to reconcile these two opposing 
tendencies. In the event, Aristotle’s influential insistence that reality comprises a multitude of 
discrete objects and things, led to the metaphysics of Being becoming dominant in western 
thought (Whitehead, 1926/1985).  
 According to this Being worldview, the real world comprises “a succession of 
instantaneous configurations of matter” (Whitehead, 1926/1985, p. 63); stable entities, 
objects, things and events populate the universe of our senses. As such, reality readily lends 
itself to accurate naming, classification, and categorization. We say “what each part of the 
sensible continuum is, and all these abstract whats are concepts” (James, 1911/1996, p. 50). 
Learning from this resultant cognitivist viewpoint is an information-processing mental 
activity; the more abstract and generalizable the concepts the “higher” the levels of learning 
attained. Mental cognition and representation overrides practical nous and in situ adaptive 
capabilities. Aristotelian “episteme” is privileged over “techne”, “metis” and “phronesis” 
(Dunne, 1996; Chia and Holt, 2009, pp. 105-108). This penchant for the abstract over the 
concrete remains ubiquitous in Western thought. Thus, “a revolutionary designs the model for 
the city that must be built; a soldier sets out the plan of war to be followed; an economist 
decides on the growth curve to target” (Jullien, 2004, p. 3). Each projects upon the world an 
“ideal” that must then be properly “executed” in order for a concrete outcome to be realised. 
But this prioritising of the abstract over the concrete, that thought must always precede 
action, has been challenged by James March. 
March (1972, p. 419) points out that our dominant theories of learning and action 
assume that “thinking should precede action; that action should serve a purpose; that purpose 
should be defined in terms of a consistent set of pre-existent goals”. But he argues, there are 
many practical circumstances where people “act before they think” (March, 1972, p. 423) and 
yet this is hardly ever acknowledged in the social sciences and in the OL literature. This idea 
that one can act intelligently and effectively without the prior need for conscious cognition 
and representation has been forcefully argued by the philosopher Hubert Dreyfus (1988; 
1991; 2002) who drew on the works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, amongst others, to 
show that the two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and action, can be 
described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations. Dreyfus shows 
that even at the level of skill mastery, an expert chess player, for instance, is highly attuned to 
recognizing subtle evolving differences in situations and acts spontaneously upon them 
without relying on mental images or conscious assessments whatsoever (Dreyfus, 2002, pp. 
371-372). For him, true skill and mastery is all about the ability to make “refined 
discriminations” (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 8); to note the subtle “differences that make a difference” 
(Bateson, 1972, p. 453) and then to react accordingly. As such, skilled “know-how” consists 
of the ability to make “finer and finer discriminations of situations paired with the appropriate 
response to each” (Dreyfus, 2002, p. 367). All this “assessment” occurs almost spontaneously 
and relies simply on finely-honed sensitivities and nurtured predispositions to guide 
responses. Such a practice-based understanding of skill mastery is predicated upon a process-
philosophical worldview. 
 From a process-philosophical worldview, reality is perpetually fluxing, changing and 
Becoming and this means that it is virtually impossible to accurately represent and describe 
this fluid reality using language and symbols. Cognitively-based forms of knowledge, 
therefore, are “forever inadequate to the fullness of reality” (James, 1911/1996, p. 78); they 
“falsify as well as omit” (James, 1911/1996, p. 78). Therefore, to unquestioningly accept that 
formal knowledge accurately represent reality is to “mistake the map for the territory” and to 
commit a “Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness” (Whitehead, 1926/1985, p. 64). Mental 
representations regularly fail us. We do know more than we can tell (Polanyi, 1966); our 
observations and perceptions are far more fine-grained and sensuously-detailed than what 
language and cognition is able to capture and articulate. Despite this inadequacy, we are 
nevertheless still able to respond effectively to unexpected situations we may face. This is 
simply because we have acquired socially-transmitted sensitivities and predispositions (often 
unthinkingly) that enable us to do so. It is, therefore, this nurtured sensitivity to 
environmental solicitations, and the unconsciously-learnt responses shaped by a collective’s 
repertoire of practices, that enable members of a community or organization to respond 
effectively in their day-to-day engagements.  
Practices, as such are the “building blocks” of social life. Just as collectively-learnt 
productive practices and “know how” help us to skilfully extract iron ore from the mountains 
and to transform them into steel girders, clay and shale into bricks, and sand, soda, ash and 
limestone into glass, so that we are able to construct relatively permanent structural edifices 
to live in, so also established social practices help us to sensitively transform the “blooming, 
buzzing confusion” (James, 1911/1996, p. 50) of our lived experiences, into a more liveable 
social reality. We do this by selectively parsing, stabilizing and fixing aspects of it to enable 
us to forge productive relationships and to generate the social configurations that we 
subsequently find so necessary and familiar. Societies, institutions and organizations, as such, 
are tangible manifestations of our success at transforming the otherwise “wild” forces of 
change into a manageable form in order to aid social progress. Practices, therefore, are our 
human “tools” for creating and sustaining islands of social order in a relentless churning sea 
of change. They create the necessary ordering substrate upon which conscious cognition and 
representation can subsequently take place. This understanding of the social construction of 
reality is predicated upon a recent “practice turn” in social theory 
 
The Practice Turn in Social Theory 
Central to the recent “practice turn” in social theory (Schatzki, 2001) is the attempt to explain 
learning and behaviour by overcoming the dichotomy between objective “structures” and 
subjective “agency”, between the “macro” and the “micro” and between cognitivism and 
behaviourism. It attempts to create a middle ground between structural determinism and 
agentic voluntarism (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 30-51). For practice theorists, it is actions and 
practices that produce the individual and the collective and not the other way around. 
Structure and agency, and consciousness and intentionality are secondary effects of practices. 
The individual, as such, is not some isolatable, ready-made, autonomous unit but rather 
emerges “as a locus of development” within a web of social relations and practices (Ingold, 
2000, p. 3). Nor is the collective itself a discrete entity either since collectivism is “just a 
more capacious form of individualism” (Schatzki, 2005, p. 466). Thus, actors (both 
individual and collective) are not isolated pre-existing entities, but temporarily stabilized 
relational “bundles of practices”, sensitivities and predispositions (Schatzki, 2005).  
Practices interactively help shape, compose and configure relationships, identities, 
entities and outcomes. Much like a flock of migrating wild geese instinctively sensing the 
movement of others fly in formation through spontaneous coordination, practices do not arise 
from any conscious orchestration but emerge spontaneously from the linking of “a profound 
mutual susceptibility” by members “who constantly modify their habitual individual 
responses as they interact with each other” in order to achieve a collectively satisfactory 
outcome (Barnes, 2001, pp. 23-24). This kind of “primitive” sensory-based learning and 
adapting is reminiscent of how children often learn to behave, not by learning abstract rules 
or instructions, but by close observation and imitation. In such immersive learning “Body 
hexis speaks directly to motor function, in the form of a pattern of postures that is both 
individual and systematic…children are particularly attentive to the gestures and postures, 
which in their eyes, express everything that goes to make an accomplished adult – a way of 
walking, a tilt of the head, facial expressions, ways of sitting and of using implements, 
always associated with a tone of voice, a style of speech” (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 17). They 
develop sensitivities, predispositions and mannerisms unconsciously and interactively and 
this non-deliberate learning happens by observing closely what other skilled practitioners are 
doing (Barnes, 2001, p. 26). Practices, therefore, are collective “accomplishments” (Barnes, 
2001, pp. 24-25). They serve as a repository of sensitivities, skills and “know how” that 
guide, but do not determine, a member’s responses to situations encountered. Each member 
of a collective invariably exhibits behaviour that is homologous with that of other members 
because what binds them are these nurtured sensitivities and dispositions more than any 
explicit set of rules, procedures or even shared visions, or pre-established goals.  
Bourdieu (1990, p. 54) calls this set of acquired sensitivities and dispositions 
“habitus”. He writes: “The habitus, a product of history, produces individual and collective 
practices…It ensures the active presence of past experiences…(that) tend to guarantee the 
‘correctness’ of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules 
and explicit norms”. Habitus describe non-cognitively how capabilities can be learnt and how 
effective actions can flow unthinkingly from a “durable transposable set of dispositions”; 
how true mastery of a skill does not presuppose a reliance on conscious intention and goal-
orientation (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53); and how strategic “moves” can be made “without being 
the product of a genuine strategic intention” (Bourdieu, 1977/2002, p. 73). According to 
Bourdieu, such practical nous is mostly passed on silently from body to body without ever 
passing through consciousness. As a consequence human activity “can be purposive (in the 
sense of being adaptively effective) without the actor having in mind a purpose (i.e., a pre-
established goal)” (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 93). In both Bourdieu’s and Dreyfus’s account, 
therefore, what unifies and renders coherent a set of behavioural responses is a practice-based 
habitus comprising a set of sensitivities and dispositions that generate a modus operandi that 
is unique to a particular collective.  
To summarize, habitus govern how “things, situations and people show up and matter to 
us” (Spinosa et al., 1997, p. 20). Through habitus, actions are “regulated” and orchestrated 
without there being any need for explicit goals, plans, routines, rules or even heuristics to 
guide such action. Yet, the habitus is by no means a deterministic structure. Instead, it 
comprises a generative “art of inventing” that makes possible “an infinite number of practices 
that are relatively unpredictable…but (that are) also limited in their diversity” (Bourdieu, 
1990, p. 55). So whilst there is clearly coherence and consistency in responses taken, there is 
also often ingenuity displayed in each response to a specific set of circumstances faced. It 
allows for novelty and surprises when thus deployed. Additionally, each such adaptive action 
undertaken in response to environmental demands helps to further refine our discriminative 
capabilities, sensitizes us to environmental affordances, and thus contributes towards 
extending the repertoire of already-established social practices to draw from in future 
encounters. In this way a community learns, grows and knows “as it goes”; in other words it 
Wayfinds its way towards an ever-widening capacity for coping with the unknown and the 
not-yet-known. It is this collectively learnt capacity that describes Organizational Learning as 
Wayfinding.   
 
Organizational Learning as Wayfinding: Refining Empirical Sensitivity 
In Poetry, Language, Thought, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1971) 
distinguishes between two modes of existence and engagement that he calls building and 
dwelling. Building is characterized by individuals distancing themselves from their lifeworld 
and relying on cognition and abstract representation to guide their actions. Thus, it is often 
assumed that we design and build before we dwell. Heidegger, however, argues convincingly 
that, “only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 148). 
Dwelling is our primary mode of existence and engagement; it precedes building. In the 
primary dwelling mode, the world does not appear pre-ordered or “ready-made” but comes 
into being through our actions and practices.  
Ingold (2011) draws on this Heideggerian distinction between building and dwelling 
to show how differently a designer/producer and a weaver approach their work. In the first 
instance, the designer/producer designs, plans and acts consciously and purposefully to 
achieve his/her pre-conceived end-goals. On the other hand, the weaver is situated “in 
amongst a world of materials, which he literally draws out in bringing forth a piece of work” 
(Ingold, 2011, p. 10). The weaver acts purposively by drawing on what is immediately 
available to deal effectively with the predicaments and obstacles he/she immediately faces 
from within the specific set of circumstances he/she finds him/herself in. This intimate link 
between dwelling and purposive action provides us with a clue as to how effective learning 
and action can take place within an immersed situation without cognition and abstract 
representation. It enables us to better appreciate how skilled practitioners become so through 
the intimate coupling of stimulus with response when immersed in the situations they find 
themselves in. The key to this kind of pre-cognitive learning is the nurturing of an empirical 
sensitivity to what a specific environment affords. 
 
Perception and Environmental Affordances 
Contrary to the principles of environmental determinism, individuals and organizations 
respond to their environment not by passively adapting to the demands of the latter, but by 
actively selecting aspects of it that provide opportunities for incorporation into their own 
need for survival and growth (Bateson, 1972; Gibson, 1979; Ingold, 2000). Through 
historically-tested practices they pro-actively fashion the environment to meet their own 
specific needs and requirements. This active appropriating happens “not because there is no 
reality outside our heads….but because we select and edit the reality” (Bateson, 1972, p. vii) 
to suit our evolving needs. Perception, as such is not the mere passive “registering” of 
externally existing phenomena, but the active construction of a liveable reality (Gibson, 
1979). In so doing, we produce what Von Uexküll (1933) calls our own Umwelt (experienced 
environmental surroundings); an environment containing significant markers or “carriers of 
significance” specific to us. 
This emphasis on the active role of sensory perception in shaping our specific 
environment forms the backbone of an alternative practice-based approach to understanding 
how learning happens at its most rudimentary level. It provides an ecologically-based 
explanation of how, in human societies, skilled practical coping is developed, refined, grown, 
and socially-transmitted within a collective without necessarily implying conscious cognition 
(Gibson, 1979; Dreyfus, 1991). According to these ecologically-based explanations, 
environmental excitations attract our attention to the affordances proffered and this then 
trigger our responses. The “environment”, therefore, comprises “organism-indexed faces of 
the world” (Sanders, 1993, p. 290, my emphasis); what is perceived to afford an organism 
such as an organization is inextricable from the organization’s own character and immediate 
preoccupations. Active sensing, perception and selection plays a crucial role in the 
organisation/environment nexus and this explains how an organization succeeds by 
sensitively seeking out and exploiting environmental opportunities.   
Affordances are the milieu of possibilities an environment proffers or furnishes for an 
active participant sensitized to it. In this regard, affordances have an objective quality about 
them but only in relation to a participant’s perceived needs. There is a “demand character” or 
an “invitation character” (Kurt Lewin, in J. F. Brown, 1929, p. 203) about the environment. 
Thus a fruit says “Eat me”, water says “Drink me” and thunder says “Fear me” (Koffka, 
1935, p. 7). But nothing is richer and more elaborate in terms of environmental affordances 
than those provided us in our social engagements and interactions; in human communities the 
possibilities are infinite. Importantly, the act of perceiving an affordance in the environment 
(whether material or social) does not imply an act of classification; it does not mean 
cognitively representing it as a mental object prior to acting on it. Rather the perceiving of an 
affordance depends on the capacity to make increasingly finer and finer discriminations 
regarding the significance of aspects of the social and material environment that holds value 
for the participating actor. For instance, members of an Inuit community are clearly able to 
finely differentiate between many different types of snow and to respond accordingly even if 
they cannot explain why they are able to do so. Their understanding derives simply from a 
constant exposure and prolonged immersion in snow conditions (Krupnik et al., 2010); for 
them the ability to sense, discriminate and respond appropriately in different snow conditions 
is a matter of life and death. Such sensitivity to environmental affordances vary from culture 
to culture, from society to society and most certainly from organization to organization. This 
helps explain why there is an irreducible idiosyncrasy unique to each society and 
organization. 
 
Learning as Refining Empirical Sensitivity 
Whilst learning is more often understood in cognitivist terms as the acquisition, storing and 
manipulation of mental images and the subsequent establishment of causal relationships, such 
an emphasis underestimates the primacy of sensory-based learning through concrete 
experiencing and its transmission through practices. In his highly acclaimed book Science 
and the Modern World, the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (1926/1985) warned that the 
educational world had become overly-preoccupied with abstract models and formulations in 
their teaching curriculum. For him, preoccupation with such “formularised information” leads 
to a “neglect to strengthen habits of concrete appreciation of the individual facts in their full 
interplay” (Whitehead, 1926/1985, p. 246). So much so that even when “you understand all 
about the sun and all about the atmosphere and all about the rotation of the earth, you may 
still miss the radiance of the sunset” (Whitehead, 1926/1985, p. 248). For Whitehead, what is 
increasingly missing in the learning agenda is the need to cultivate an “aesthetic 
appreciation” for the concreteness of lived experience; a refined empirical sensitivity to real 
goings-on in the world. This idea of learning as the relentless refining of the senses to 
environmental affordances and not as the acquisition and accumulation of knowledge or 
information is missing in the OL literature.   
Empirical sensitivity is a pre-requisite for the practice of successfully crafting, 
weaving and “bending” environmental affordances productively to meet our evolving needs. 
Learning in this more concrete sense is about refining the capacity to make ever-finer 
differentiations in in our observations; an approach William James (1912/1996, p. 42) calls 
“radical empiricism”. It is about rigorously striving to attain an “uncompromising democracy 
of vision” (Ehrenzweig, 1967, p. 29) and allowing ourselves to see more naively and 
pristinely what is really going on in the world around us and then to act accordingly. It 
emphasizes attaining fidelity in our observations through discriminative attunement. The 
importance of nurturing this “aesthetic appreciation” is well understood in the arts and 
humanities and is variously alluded to in the social critic John Ruskin’s (1927, Vol. 4, p. 27) 
notion of the “innocence of the eye” and in the art theorist Anton Ehrenzweig (1967) notion 
of “artistic rigor”. It is even appreciated in the Japanese industrialist Konusuke Matsushita’s 
(1978/1986, p. 63-65) insistence on the need to cultivate a “meek, tractable and un-trapped 
sunao mind” to enables us to see more clearly what is going on to aid our decision-making.  
This idea of learning, not as the acquisition of abstract knowledge but as the refining 
of empirical sensitivity is vital for sustainable organizational success. It resonates with what 
Teece (2012, p. 1396) alludes to but does not elaborate upon sufficiently in his discussion of 
the notion of “dynamic capabilities” as an organization’s ability to “sense”, “seize” and 
“transform” opportunities detected in its operating environment. This empirical “sensing” and 
the associated resourcefulness, I maintain, derives from an organization’s cultivated 
sensitivities and predispositions, but this practice-view of what “sensing” entails is not well 
understood in the strategy literature. As a consequence, there have been various conflicting 
attempts to define “dynamic capabilities” in the strategy literature (Teece et al., 1997; 
Eistnhardt and Martin, 2000; Peteraf et al., 2013) without much consensus. What is missing 
is an understanding of empirical sensitivity as a crucial element of organizational success; it 
enables organizations to learn and respond through the process of Wayfinding. 
 
Organizational Learning as Wayfinding 
The act of “navigation”, as we have alluded to, entails a reliance on pre-set goals and pre-
charted maps. It presupposes the detached ability to survey the terrain to be navigated in 
advance. In the actual world of organizational realities, however, such detach surveying is 
unrealisable; the organization is inextricably immersed and intertwined with its environment 
and both are perpetually shifting and changing. What is more appropriate for guiding 
response, therefore, is a practice-driven, sensory-based form of learning that allows for 
constant searching, adjustments, reconfiguration of responses and re-education of attention to 
emergent issues at hand. Ingold (2000, pp. 230-235) terms this collective responsive search 
for ever-newer pathways to negotiate and overcome the challenges faced, “wayfinding”. 
Wayfinding entails learning and knowing through iterative practical coping actions taken in 
situ and sponte sua. It presumes that in rapidly evolving and changing circumstances we can 
only “know as we go” (Ingold, 2000, p. 229). The wayfinding organization, as such, relies 
primarily on its repertoire of practices generated from past experiences, its refined 
sensitivities, and on habituated ways of responding to tentatively negotiate its way through an 
as-yet uncharted terrain.  
Wayfinding better describes the reality faced by many organizations when confronted 
with unprecedented changes and are therefore forced to path-find their way towards 
sustainable existence and growth. It is about “reaching out into the unknown and developing 
an incomplete but practically sufficient comprehension of the situation in order to cope 
effectively with it” (Chia and Holt, 2009, p. 159). Surprise, uncertainty and novelty are the 
natural order of the day in such practical coping circumstances. OL as Wayfinding 
presupposes organizational actors to be immersed in the immediacy and mobility of their 
changing circumstances so that they have no choice but to rely on their empirical sensitivities 
and to draw on their repository of socially-acquired practices to respond appropriately and 
effectively to situations encountered.  
This view of organizational life as immersed, ongoing practical coping, is one familiar 
to many experienced managers even though it conflicts with much of managerial talk that 
emphasises decisiveness, certainty, and clarity of action. For real organizational actors, 
however, the world “imposes its presence…its urgencies, its things to be done and said” 
(Bourdieu, 1990, p. 52) without ever unfolding dramatically as a spectacle for an external 
observer. Coherence in actions taken therefore emerges inadvertently, not from any grand 
plan, but from acquired sensitivities and dispositions. Wayfinding implies the real possibility 
of surprises, fortuitous discoveries and the uncovering of hidden potentialities that are 
associated with an opportunity-seeking orientation. It prepares an organization for dealing 
with the unexpected, the unthought and the unthinkable in ways that are ultimately beneficial. 
OL as Wayfinding is what engenders organizational resilience and inventiveness. 
 
Conclusion 
The literature on OL is underpinned by two contrasting learning emphases; one cognitivist, 
the other behaviourist. The “practice turn” in social theory provides a “third way” of 
understanding how organizations are able to learn and respond to environmental 
circumstances without overly relying on conscious cognition. Much of OL, as a collective 
endeavour, can be adequately explained non-cognitively as the silent transmission and 
absorption of social practices by organizational members; it occurs non-deliberately and 
unconsciously.  
This practice view is underpinned by a process-philosophical understanding of reality. 
Practices, as such, are the primary “tools” that we rely upon to construct our social orders. 
Practices account for the finely-honed organizational capacity to detect environmental 
affordances and to respond effectively to such solicitations. Practices help sharpen empirical 
sensitivities and ensure the development of appropriates disposition to respond accordingly. 
Organizations as such learn continuously and unconsciously through their practical 
engagements. In the face of uncertainty, organizations succeed more by sensing, improvising 
and adapting as they go. In contrast to “navigation” which relies on pre-established maps and 
which assumes that we must know cognitively “before we go”, organizations in practice often 
non-deliberately “Wayfind” their way towards eventual success  
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